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ABSTRACT
Expanding essential health services through non-government organisations (NGOs) is a central strategy for achieving universal
health coverage in many low-income and middle-income countries. Human immunodeﬁciency virus (HIV) prevention services
for key populations are commonly delivered through NGOs and have been demonstrated to be cost-effective and of substantial
global public health importance. However, funding for HIV prevention remains scarce, and there are growing calls internation-
ally to improve the efﬁciency of HIV prevention programmes as a key strategy to reach global HIV targets. To date, there is
limited evidence on the determinants of costs of HIV prevention delivered through NGOs; and thus, policymakers have little
guidance in how best to design programmes that are both effective and efﬁcient. We collected economic costs from the Indian
Avahan initiative, the largest HIV prevention project conducted globally, during the ﬁrst 4 years of its implementation. We use a
ﬁxed-effect panel estimator and a random-intercept model to investigate the determinants of average cost. We ﬁnd that pro-
gramme design choices such as NGO scale, the extent of community involvement, the way in which support is offered to NGOs
and how clinical services are organised substantially impact average cost in a grant-based payment setting. © 2016 The Authors.
Health Economics published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The UNAIDS strategic investment framework for an effective response to human immunodeﬁciency virus
(HIV)/AIDS proposes the scale-up of HIV prevention for key populations as one of its core interventions
(Schwartländer et al., 2011). This prioritisation is supported by strong evidence of the cost-effectiveness of
HIV prevention to key populations (Vassall et al., 2014). However, resources to expand HIV prevention to
all who may beneﬁt from it remain scarce. Because of the recent ﬂat lining of development assistance for
health, increased attention has been placed on identifying potential economic efﬁciency (achieving optimal
HIV prevention service provision at the lowest cost) gains in HIV prevention in low-income and
*Correspondence to: Department of Global Health and Development, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, Keppel Street,
London WC1E 7HT, UK. E-mail: Aurelia.Lepine@lshtm.ac.uk
†In alphabetical order: James Blanchardf, Shajy Isacc, Catherine M. Lowndesg, Banadakoppa M. Rameshc,f, Sushena Reza-Paulc,f and
Reynold Washingtonc,f
© 2016 The Authors. Health Economics published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
HEALTH ECONOMICS
Health Econ. 25(Suppl. 1): 67–82 (2016)
Published online in Wiley Online Library (wileyonlinelibrary.com). DOI: 10.1002/hec.3296
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial License, which permits use, distribu-
tion and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited and is not used for commercial purposes.
The copyright line for this article was changed on 21 January 2016 after original online publication.
middle-income countries, in order to reduce the funding gap and ensure value for money (Murray et al., 2012).
For example, several global funding bodies are now considering programmes to promote efﬁciency and/or the
setting of benchmark costs (The Ofﬁce of the US Global Aids Coordinator, 2014).
Understanding the drivers of costs of HIV prevention is essential for those implementing HIV prevention
programmes to design interventions that are both effective and economically efﬁcient (Marseille et al., 2004;
Marseille et al., 2007b). Empirically based cost functions can be used in resource allocation models that seek to
optimise resource allocation between packages of interventions at different scales. Cost functions are also of
critical importance to resource needs estimates more generally (Over et al., 2006). Finally, cost functions can help
those monitoring the efﬁciency of HIV programmes, and understanding the drivers of costs can help programme
managers identify areas of efﬁciency improvement and take corrective action (Schwartländer et al., 2011).
However, the dearth of cost and programmatic data required to conduct such analyses has resulted into very few
reports examining the costs and efﬁciency of HIV services using econometric methods (Marseille et al., 2012;
Menzies et al., 2012; Rosen et al., 2008). There are only a few costing studies of HIV prevention projects, and most
of these available data sets contain a limited number of observations preventing from conducting any multivariate
analysis and have a cross-sectional nature. In particular, little is known about the drivers of costs above the service
level, with previous studies focusing on the determinants of service delivery site costs only. Moreover, most
previous studies examining cost drivers of HIV services in low-income and middle-income country have not been
able to fully develop models that explore the determinants of costs in the non-government sector; despite the
increasing reliance of both non-government organisations (NGOs) and community-based organisations to expand
essential health services in those countries.
This study therefore aims to begin to address this gap by learning lessons from the Avahan project in India, one of
the largest HIV prevention project in the world. Launched in 2003 by the Bill &Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF)
in six Indian states (Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra, Manipur and Nagaland), Avahan’s aim
was to deliver HIV prevention to high-risk populations at scale. We therefore present here an investigation into the
drivers of cost of the Avahan programme during scale-up in order to inform programme managers to design
economically efﬁcient HIV prevention services and to inform the design of HIV programmes that provide grants
to NGOs more generally.
2. STUDY SETTING AND INTERVENTION DESCRIPTION
Avahan is one of the largest HIV prevention project in the world. NGOs are provided grants by Avahan through state
lead partners (SLPs) to build a relationship with key populations (female sexworkers (FSWs) and high-riskmenwho
have sex with men or transgenders) in order to provide HIV prevention services. The package of HIV prevention
services provided includes outreach through peers, behaviour change communication, condom distribution, clinical
services for sexually transmitted infections (STIs), community mobilisation, advocacy and enabling environment
activities. Peer educators provided services to about 25–50 people each, sharing prevention information, distributing
supplies (condoms and lubricants) and providing referral for STI management. STI clinics followed standard proto-
cols for STI management. Community mobilisation, advocacy and enabling environment activities varied across the
sites and included the formation of self-help groups, various drop-in centre (DIC) events, skills training, legal literacy
workshops, police and stakeholder sensitisation, crisis response teams and access to social entitlements. HIV preven-
tion across all four states was guided by a common minimum programme. These included a set of implementation
standards for technical and managerial areas, project milestones, a common management framework and a common
set of indicators. Beyond this, there was ﬂexibility to adapt services based on local context.
In the four study states (Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu and Maharashtra), the Avahan initiative was
implemented by 138 NGOs, supported by six SLPs and pan-Avahan capacity building partners (contracted by
the BMGF, which also had a national level ofﬁce at Delhi). SLPs provided technical assistance to develop
programme strategies, developed communication materials, enhanced the expertise of NGO staff, provided
supportive supervision and supported the purchase and distribution of commodities. At the national level, Avahan
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developed over-arching programme strategies and organised annual partners meetings to coordinate with Indian
authorities. The national level ofﬁce also developed and maintained a computerised monitoring and information
system, provided ﬁnancial oversight and monitored programme evaluation. International and national technical
assistance was primarily focused on enhancing the expertise to deliver STI services, improving interpersonal
communication and providing support for advocacy and community mobilisation.
Avahan achieved an exceptionally rapid pace of scale-up of HIV prevention services, going from a coverage
of 22 000 persons covered in December 2003 to 280 000 persons reached per year in December 2007 (Bill and
Melinda Gates Foundation, 2008). In total, in the data we collected, we observe that 725 040 high-risk persons
(FSWs and their clients and men who have sex with men) were reached between 2004 and 2007, 177 million
condoms were directly distributed by Avahan NGOs and 529 381 STI visits were provided. Extensive research
has been conducted to evaluate the impact and cost-effectiveness of the Avahan programme. Pickles et al.
(2013) reported decline in FSW HIV prevalence and between 142 and 2092 FSW HIV infections averted
per district, with twofold to ninefold more among FSW clients. Correspondingly, Vassall et al. (2014) found
a mean incremental cost per HIV infection averted of $US785 and a mean incremental cost per disability-
adjusted life year averted of $US46 well below a willingness to pay threshold of one gross domestic product
per capita of around $US1500 (data.worldbank.org) Future antiretroviral treatment cost savings over the life-
time of the FSW cohort exposed to Avahan were estimated to be over $US77 million. This is modest compared
with the total health expenditure in India but important in a context with around $US20 health expenditure per
capita (Organisation of Economic Co-Operation and Development, 2014).
3. METHODS
3.1. Cost data
Avahan has produced one of the largest cost data set globally; further details can be found in Chandrashekar et al.
(2014). Cost data were collected from 138 NGOs in 64 districts of four Indian states over 4 years from 2004 to
2007. Costs were collected from NGOs, SLPs, the BMGF Avahan ofﬁce and pan-Avahan capacity building
partners. Cost data were collected prospectively using a top–down approach to allocate costs to NGOs and speciﬁc
HIV prevention activities. The same costing method was used across NGOs and over time, limiting bias resulting
from the heterogeneity of the costing method. Every NGO partner was automatically included in the sample,
allowing us to have an exhaustive sample of the NGOs in the Avahan programme over the period considered.
Expenses prior to the ﬁrst person being reached by the programme were treated as start-up costs and were
annuitised. Costs included all recurrent costs (personnel costs, building operating expenses, travel expenses, STI
supplies, monitoring costs, information education and communication costs, training costs, condom supplies
and indirect expenses) and capital costs (buildings, equipment, furniture, vehicles, initial training, insurance and
deposits and start-up costs).
Methods for allocating costs above the NGO level to NGOs were derived based on programme records, expen-
ditures reports and interviews with BMGF Avahan and SLP staff. The ﬁrst step was to allocate national level pro-
gramme costs to each SLP. This was carried out ﬁrst by allocating speciﬁc grants to each SLP and then for general
programme management costs by using expenditure reports and mapping estimates of the key population covered
by each SLP (the method reported by BMGF staff to be used for budget/grant allocation to each SLP). Thereafter,
SLP costs (including BMGF costs) were ﬁrst allocated to speciﬁc activity areas (for example, programmemanage-
ment and expertise enhancement) within the SLP. This was carried out primarily on the basis of the description
provided in detailed salaries reports and expenditure records, and where the allocation was not clear, interviews
with SLP staff were conducted. Thereafter, an allocation criterion for each activity cost was applied to allocate
the cost to NGOs. The criteria used were derived after extensive interviews with staff on how they allocated their
time and resources among NGOs. In the main, the allocation criterion used was either an equal division of cost or
an allocation based on estimated population size covered by the NGO. This latter measurement does not
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necessarily measure true output of each NGO, as they did not always cover the entire population in need, and there
was some measurement error. However, this was the best information SLPs had to hand when allocated resources
such as communication materials. For some activities, costs could be directly allocated as the expenditure records
including this description. This latter situation particularly applied in the case of support and supervision costs
where detailed travel records were often described. Items such as STI drugs management could also be directly
allocated based on order levels.
At the NGO level, costs were disaggregated by activity and input type. Field visits and time sheets were
conducted in order to estimate the share of labour costs allocated to different NGO sub-activities (outreach,
community mobilisation, etc.). Unpaid volunteer time was estimated by the amount of time spent on the project
and calculated based on peer educator salary. Other donated goods, such as commodities were valued using
market prices. Average cost per person reached at least once by the NGO over the year was calculated using
the numbers of persons reached obtained from Avahan’s central management information system. All costs
are presented in $US 2008 in Table I.
3.2. Model speciﬁcation
We investigated the determinants of average cost, that is, the cost per person reached. We analyse the determi-
nants of two types of costs: (1) average NGO costs AC_ngoit include all the costs incurred at the NGO level and
(2) programme average cost AC_totit that is made of the sum of NGO cost, SLP cost and national level cost.
Average cost for each year (ACit) for NGO i in year t is described in terms of NGO and programme costs
(the sum of NGO cost, SLP cost and national programme level cost) in order to investigate separately the
determinants of NGO and programme average costs. The major share of programme average cost (73%)
incurred above the level of service delivery (Chandrashekar et al., 2014). The average programme cost across
Table I. Total economic costs by organisational level and input 2004 to 2008 ($US 2008)
Input 2004–2005 % 2005–2006 % 2006–2007 % 2007–2008 % Total %
State lead partner
Capital cost 321 707 10 710 314 9 740 217 8 828 565 9 2 600 803 9
Personnel 1 461 108 44 3 326 119 43 3 346 931 37 3 794 869 40 11 929 028 40
Travel 260 931 8 583 292 8 552 527 6 794 457 8 2 191 207 7
Building operating
and maintenance
128 889 4 685 979 9 875 273 10 839 026 9 2 529 167 9
Commodities and
supplies
315 164 9 928 084 12 1 137 772 13 1 130 847 12 3 511 867 12
Monitoring and
evaluation
473 509 14 578 504 7 726 454 8 430 071 5 2 208 540 7
Trainings 302 135 9 612 627 8 1 248 216 14 1 027 480 11 3 190 457 11
Indirect expenses 69 596 2 349 340 4 389 641 4 658 639 7 1 467 216 5
Grand total 3 333 038 100 7 774 257 100 9 017 032 100 9 503 954 100 29 628 284 100
District level (NGO)
Capital cost 335 362 15 771 906 11 986 912 9 1 242 946 9 3 337 127 10
Personnel 988 547 43 3 248 881 47 4 557 267 43 6 335 755 44 15 130 451 44
Travel 148 326 6 456 460 7 696 232 7 973 823 7 2 274 841 7
Building operating
and maintenance
161 702 7 386 134 6 515 022 5 1 109 663 8 2 172 521 6
Commodities and
supplies*
430 133 19 1 724 818 25 3 264 794 31 3 938 449 27 9 358 194 27
Monitoring and
evaluation
119 348 5 91 711 1 89 520 1 152 707 1 453 286 1
Trainings 103 761 5 228 316 3 388 067 4 647 648 4 1 367 792 4
Indirect expenses 7958 0 33 313 0 151 883 1 140 755 1 333 906 1
Grand total 2 295 137 100 6 941 539 100 10 649 697 100 14 541 746 100 34 428 119 100
IEC, information, education and communication; NGO, non-government organisation.
*Drugs, condoms and IEC materials.
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the whole programme, between 2004 and 2007 was $US362, but two NGOs had extreme values leading to a
positive skew of the NGO average cost distribution of 13.92. Following this, to include extreme values and also
remove skewness in the residuals, the average unit costs were log transformed.
Based on previous literature (Meyer-Rath and Over 2012; Siapka et al., 2013; Dandona et al., 2005;
Chandrashekar et al., 2010; Guinness et al., 2005; Guinness et al., 2007; Kumaranayake and Watts, 2000;
Marseille et al., 2007a; Menzies et al., 2012; Rosen et al., 2008), several potential categories of determinants
of average cost were explored. The justiﬁcation of covariates in each of these six categories is detailed
in Table II.
Regarding the functional form, we tested a logarithmic form versus a quadratic functional form. We found
that the logarithmic ﬁt explains a larger share of the variance than the quadratic ﬁt.1 Despite the sound theoret-
ical basis, empirically, a number of studies that have analysed average cost function of hospitals suggest that
the cost function may be more consistent with an L-shaped curve (Lave and Lave, 1970). The econometric
models used were thus deﬁned using a logarithmic cost function (Vitaliano, 1987).
Log ACitð Þ ¼ δ0 þ δ1 logYit þ δ2 qit þδ3 Oit þ δ4 Cit þ δ5 Eit þui þ eit (1)
Log ACitð Þ ¼ δ0 þ δ1 logYit þ δ2 qit þδ3 Oit þ δ4 Cit þ δ5 Eit þ δ6 Ei þζ i þ eit (2)
where Yit refers to scale or number of high-risk population reached, qit are proxies for the quality of the services
provided by the NGO, Oit refers to NGO’s organisational characteristics, Cit are characteristics of high-risk
groups reached, Eit and Ei are respectively environmental time-variant and time-invariant characteristics, eit
is an error term, ui is the NGO ﬁxed effect and ζ i is an intercept at the NGO level.
Equation 1, our primary model, is estimated with a panel model given the structure of the data. A Hausman
test (1978) was conducted in order to choose between a panel estimator with ﬁxed effects and random effects.
The test rejected the null hypothesis that random effects provide consistent estimates, and a panel estimator with
NGO ﬁxed effects ui was therefore selected. Conversely to a random effect model, the ﬁxed-effect estimator
allows for arbitrary correlation between NGO unobserved time-constant characteristics and the explanatory
variables at any time period. The ﬁxed-effects approach thus allowed us to remove the effect of NGOs’ time-
constant characteristics from the covariates so that the estimated coefﬁcients of the ﬁxed-effects model are not
biased because of omitted time-invariant NGO characteristics. This may be important as theoretically time-
constant unobserved characteristics of the NGOs may have a strong effect on average costs, and it may be
difﬁcult to know a priori how their omission may affect the results. In fact, some NGOs may have better intrinsic
characteristics than others. For example, some NGOs may combine both better management (leading to cost
minimisation) and a higher ability in targeting vulnerable population (leading to higher scale), and in which case,
the omission of these characteristics will lead to an overestimation of economies of scale. But other NGOs may
have strong management but may lack of skills to increase scale or vice versa, resulting in an underestimation of
economies of scale.
By using a ﬁxed-effect estimator, we implicitly assume that NGO-unobserved heterogeneity is correlated
with our covariates. Because of this, any explanatory variable that is constant over time for each NGO
becomes swept away by the ﬁxed-effects transformation. This is an issue when one is interested in explan-
atory variables that are constant over time. For instance, characteristics of the district were obtained from
round 3 (2007–2008) of the District Level Household and facility Survey. In order to enable the coefﬁcients
of time-invariant explanatory variables to be estimated, Equation 2 is estimated using a random-intercept
model. Note that we have also used a generalised estimating equation using a gamma distribution to
estimate this model that provided similar results. These results are available upon request. To test
multicollinearity, variance inﬂation factors (VIFs) are used. The VIF shows how much the variance of the
coefﬁcient estimate is being inﬂated by multicollinearity. The mean VIF was around 1.54 and the maximum
was 2.4, which does not suggest high multicollinearity. Finally, it should be noted that the parameter δ1 is
interpreted as an elasticity2 as both variables are log-transformed; other coefﬁcients δn are transformed
using (100 * eδ).
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Table II. Variable description and expected effect on average cost
Variable name Description
Expected
effect Justiﬁcation
Scale (Yit)
log Yit Number of persons who have had at least one
contact with a peer educator
 Economies of scale
Quality of outreach (qit)
STI visits/Yit Number of STI visits per person reached + Quality is expected to be positively
correlated with cost.
Treated STI/Yit Number of STI treated per person reached + or  Although quality is expected to be
positively correlated with cost, STI
services in NGOs with higher treatment
levels may be delegated to referral clinic
and may then result in NGO cost savings.
Condoms distributed/Yit Number of condom distributed per person
reached
+ Quality is expected to be positively
correlated with cost.
NGO organisational characteristics (Oit)
Members in community
mobilisation/Yit
Number of members of various programmes
committees (community and non-community)
per persons reached
 Community mobilisation may decrease
average cost through the participation of
community to increase scale-up and
through the reduction in stigma.
Share of management
staff in total staff
Proportion of management staff in total staff + or  Effect on costs results from the wage
and productivity of this staff category.
Outreach clinic/Yit Number of outreach clinic per persons reached.
Outreach clinic are periodic clinics conducted
at different locations by mobile clinic teams,
usually at a DIC/safe space identiﬁed by
community. They provide ﬁeld-based health
care and only operate on selected days; unit
is location of outreach clinic.
 NGO can delegate services to experienced
clinics that will conduct those services in
a more efﬁcient way.
DIC/Yit * 10 000 DIC per 10 000 persons reached  DIC may affect negatively the cost as they
provide an opportunity for the NGO to
reach many high-risk persons at one time
Characteristic of high-risk population targeted (Cit)
FSW/Yit Share of FSWs in total reached population (that
includes sex workers and men who have sex
with men)
 It may be cheaper to reach FSWs than
men who have sex with men because of
lower stigma.
Share of group-based
FSW
Share of group based (brothel-based, lodge-
based and Tamasha-based FSW) in total FSW
reached
 Reaching group-based sex workers may
be cheaper than reaching street-based sex
workers as peer educators may need to
spend less time to reach the same
quantity of sex workers.
Environmental time-variant characteristics (Eit)
Log of estimated
population
Estimated number of high-risk population in the
district
+ or  Possibly acts as a barrier to NGO expansion.
But NGOs located in areas with many
high-risk persons could also experience
some logistic and management issues.
NGOs per district Number of NGOs in the district + or  There could be some positive or negative
externalities on the average cost depending
on the density of the NGOs per district.
NGOs per SLP Number of NGOs supported by the same SLP + or  SLPs that only contract with a few NGOs
could lack of experience; however, if the
number of NGOs per SLP is too high, it
may generate some managerial issues.
NGO replaced Was coded 1 if the NGO was replaced by
another NGO
+ May be a signal for high level of
inefﬁciency. May capture corruption
level and a lack of organisation.
Environmental time-invariant characteristics (Ei)
Electricity Percentage of households having access to
electricity in the district
 Electricity access may be a source of
efﬁciency
Population Inhabitants in the district + or 
(Continues)
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4. RESULTS
Descriptive statistics of all dependent variables and covariates are presented in Table III. In the data, the aver-
age yearly NGO cost is $US81, and the average yearly programme cost is $US362. On average, 1868 high-risk
persons were reached by each NGO per year, and each person reached received 0.7 STI visit, 0.4 STI treat-
ments and 248 condoms per year on average. Regarding the staff structure, the peer educators represent 79%
of the total labour force in the NGO, while medical staff and management staff account for 11% and 10%,
respectively. On average, 1.3% of the persons reached participated in community mobilisation and there are
on average 27 DIC per 10 000 persons reached. FSWs represent 78% of the total number of persons reached.
Among those FSW, 19% are group based. There are on average 2.6 NGOs in each district and 19 NGOs per
SLP, and around 3% of the Avahan NGOs were replaced during the reporting period by another NGO.
Forty-ﬁve percent of Avahan NGOs had a previous experience in working on HIV, and on average, NGOs have
3 years of experience in working for Avahan during the reporting period and 19 years of experience in working
as an NGO.
4.1. Determinants of average cost at the NGO level
Table IV shows the determinants of NGO average cost. Models (1a) and (1b) present our primary model; the
panel estimator with NGO ﬁxed effects. In model (1b), the typology of sex workers reached is added as a
covariate, and thus, column (1b) focuses only on the FSW population (explaining the drop in the number of
observations). Results presented in models (2a) and (2b) are estimated with the random intercept estimator
allowing the associations of time-invariant covariates to be explored. Model (2a) does not include SLP
dummies, while model (2b) does, which allows to control for unobserved effects of the SLP.
Table II. (Continued)
Variable name Description
Expected
effect Justiﬁcation
Likely to depend on how this is correlated
with the share of high-risk population
in total population
Distance to nearest
town
Average distance to nearest town in the district + or  This may depend on the location of
high-risk population in the intervention
area of the NGO.
Wealth Average wealth index of households in the
district
+ or  Wealth in the area should be correlated not
only with better infrastructures but also
with higher prices.
Access to drinking
water
Percentage of households having access to
drinking water in the district
 Access to drinking water may be associated
with the quality of infrastructures in
the district.
Years in Avahan Number of years in the Avahan initiative + or  Experience may increase efﬁciency, but
services may be expanded over time.
HIV experience Coded 1 if the NGO had HIV experience before
entering Avahan
 NGOs with experience in HIV may have
already worked with high-risk groups.
Year of experience Year of experience of the NGO working as an
NGO.
 NGOs that are experienced may be more
efﬁcient.
Solo district Takes the value of 1 if the NGO is alone to
operate in the district, and the value of 0 if there
is a co-intervention with other state AIDS
control society intervention or a non-Avahan
intervention
 Competition between NGOs of different
projects may be a source of efﬁciency.
SLP State lead partner dummies + or  Depending on the SLP characteristics
DIC, drop in centres; FSW, female sex workers; HIV, human immunodeﬁciency virus; NGO, non-government organisation; SLP, state lead
partners; STI, sexually transmitted infection.
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4.1.1. Scale. Referring to our primary model in column (1a), we ﬁnd a negative association between scale and
unit cost. If NGO scale increases by 1%, unit cost decreases by 0.36%. This association is greater (0.4%) when
we restrict the sample to sex workers (e.g. column 2a).
4.1.2. Quality of outreach. The number of STI visits per person reached and the number of condoms distributed
per person reached have a positive association with NGO average cost (as shown in Figure 1(a)). An increase in
one STI visit per person reached increases NGO average cost by 15%,3 while distributing 100 additional condoms
to every person reached results in an increase in NGO average cost by approximately 10%. Conversely, we ﬁnd
that the number of treated STIs per person reached is negatively correlated with NGO average cost.
4.1.3. NGO organisational characteristics. The share of management staff of overall NGO is positively corre-
lated with NGO average cost, an increase in 1% in the proportion of management staff increased NGO average cost
by 3%. Conversely, we also investigated the role of the proportion of other categories of staff (peer educators and
Table III. Descriptive statistics
Variables Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Average cost (ACit)
NGO average cost (AC_ngoit) in $US 388 81.113 272.045 9.3 3870.8
Log of NGO average cost (LogAC_ngoit) 388 3.906 0.7291 2.230 8.261
Total average cost (AC_totit) in $US 389 361.652 1931.44 36.8 32 056.4
Log of total average cost (LogAC_totit) 389 5.0604 0.803 3.605 10.375
Scale (Yit)
Number of persons reached (Yit) 388 1868.66 1729.984 20 12 071
Log of number of persons reached (log Yit) 388 7.148 0.973 2.996 9.399
Quality of outreach (qit)
Number of STI visit per person reached (STI visit/Yit) 388 0.773 0.810 0 10.75
Number of treated STI per person reached (treated STI/Yit) 388 0.399 0.685 0 7.830
Number of condom distributed per person reached (condom distributed/Yit) 388 248.438 242.512 0 1561.993
NGO organisational characteristics (Oit)
Members in community mobilisation per person reached 388 0.013 0.035 0 0.469
Share of management staff in total staff 424 10.283 10.995 0 100.02
Outreach clinic per person reached 388 0.0002 0.0004 0 0.003
DIC for 10 000 persons reached 388 27.481 52.449 0 506.329
Characteristic of high-risk population targeted (Cit)
Share of FSWs among persons reached (%) 388 77.739 34.198 0 100
Share of group-based FSW among total FSW (%) 303 19.988 32.037 0 100
Environmental time-variant characteristics (Eit)
Log of estimated high-risk population 387 7.220 0.796 3.932 9.467
NGOs per district 492 2.652 2.188 1 10
NGOs per SLP 522 19.138 6.697 9 35
NGO was replaced 552 0.029 0.168 0 1
Environmental time-invariant characteristics (Ei)
Electricity access in district (%) 492 0.780 0.158 0.290 1
Population in district (%) 492 3447.544 1632.698 720.842 8756.521
Distance to nearest town in district (%) 492 15.853 5.005 7 34.6
Wealth in district 552 0.058 0.420 0.606 1.174
Drinking water access in district (%) 492 0.869 0.169 0.286 1
Years in Avahan 552 3 1.149 0 4
HIV experience of the NGO 444 0.450 0.498 0 1
Year of experience of the NGO 464 18.810 8.451 2 57
Only NGO in district (solo district) 469 0.537 0.499 0 1
2. SLP (ref 1. SLP) 552 0.116 0.320 0 1
3. SLP 552 0.101 0.302 0 1
4. SLP 552 0.145 0.352 0 1
5. SLP 552 0.203 0.402 0 1
6. SLP 552 0.289 0.454 0 1
AC, average cost; DIC, drop in centres; FSW, female sex workers; NGO, non-government organisation; SLP, state lead partners; STI,
sexually transmitted infection.
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medical staff), and it had no effect on NGO average cost.4 Correspondingly, the number of outreach clinics per
person reached is positively correlated with average costs. We also ﬁnd a negative inﬂuence on average cost of
membership by communities in programme organisations. An increase in one additional member (per person
reached) would decrease NGO average cost by 63%.5 However, it should be noted that community mobilisation
was nascent in Avahan at the time of the study, so the observed range from which this covariate is derived is
extremely low.
4.1.4. Characteristics of high-risk population. The characteristics of populations served by NGOs (FSW/Yit)
have a moderate effect on cost because an increase in 1% of FSWs as a proportion of all clients reached decreased
NGO average cost by 0.8%. The squared term used to investigate whether there was non-linearity in this effect was
not signiﬁcant, and therefore, there was no potential gain from specialisation that could potentially be obtained if
NGOs were to focus on a particular type of key population. We also observe in column (1b) that the type of sex
workers reached has a low effect on NGO average cost, although the negative sign conforms to our assumption
that reaching group-based sex workers allows reducing NGO average cost.
4.1.5. Environmental time-variant characteristics.With regard to environmental characteristics, the replacement
of NGOs is found to have a positive effect on the average programme cost, increasing it by about 22%. However,
the number of NGOs per district and per SLP has no impact on cost. The number of estimated population also does
not have any effect on NGO average cost.
4.1.6. Environmental time-invariant characteristics. Columns (2a) and (2b) of Table IV allow us to examine the
effect of time-invariant environmental characteristics. Regarding setting characteristics, access to electricity in the
district is associated with decreased NGO cost as expected. Others characteristics of the district are not statistical
signiﬁcant cost predictors. However, the years in Avahan is positively correlated with NGO average cost, which
is unexpected. Finally, our results indicate that the SLP is an important predictor of NGO average cost.
4.2. Determinants of average cost at the programme level
4.2.1. Scale. The main difference in results between the models examining just NGO costs programme costs is
the scale effect, as we can see in Table V. This effect is twice as large when focusing at the programme level
Figure 1. Non-linear relationships between average cost and its predictors. Predicted values estimated using the pooled panel with NGO
ﬁxed effects for the 4 years and plotted using a lowess smoothing. NGO, non-government organisation; AC, average cost; STI, sexually
transmitted infection
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compared with the NGO level. When NGO scale increases by 1%, programme average cost decreases by
0.73%. The relationship between scale and average cost is shown in Figure 1(b).
4.2.2. Quality of outreach. SomeNGO average cost predictors remained important determinants of the programme
average cost, including the number of STI visits and condoms distributed per person reached still have a positive re-
lation with average cost, while the number of treated STIs is still negatively correlated with average programme cost.
4.2.3. NGO organisational characteristics. It is important to note that the high coefﬁcient for the number of
outreach clinics per person reached was negatively associated with programme average cost; working in the opposite
direction to NGO costs – suggesting that programme costs fall as NGOs use outreach rather than referral clinics.
However, community mobilisation did not have any statistical signiﬁcant effect on overall programme average costs.
4.2.4. Characteristics of high-risk population targeted. Our assumption that targeting sex workers results in
lower costs than targeting men who have sex with men was conﬁrmed at the programme level; however, the
effect is even lower than at the NGO level.
4.2.5. Environmental time-variant characteristics. The number of estimated (mapped) potential persons reached
in a district was positively correlated with programme average cost, an increase in 1% in the size of the estimated
population increases programme average cost by 0.169%. The number of NGOs per district was negatively
correlated with the programme average cost, an additional NGO per district decreased the programme average cost
by 7.9%. The non-linear effect, investigated using a squared term, suggested that an additional NGO per district
was a source of cost reduction. At the programme level, we do not ﬁnd that the replacement of NGOs has a positive
effect on the average programme cost using the panel estimator with ﬁxed effects although the coefﬁcient remains
high (14.5% increase in programme costs). Using the random intercept model with SLP dummies (column 2b of
Table V), the coefﬁcient is even greater and statistically signiﬁcant and suggests that the bankruptcy of an NGO
increases programme average cost by 17.3%.
4.2.6. Environmental time-invariant characteristics. Finally, regarding time-invariant characteristics, access to
electricity in the district decreased average programme cost by 43%, and wealth in the district was positively
correlated with average programme cost. However, these effects disappear after adding SLP dummies. Conversely,
the number of years in Avahan remains positively correlated with programme cost, with a similar coefﬁcient than
the one obtained from the NGO model. Results at the programme level also conﬁrm that the SLP also plays an
important role in the costs of the programme.
5. DISCUSSION
Our study aimed to identify the determinants of costs of and NGO delivered HIV prevention programmes for key
populations. Our results suggest that programme design characteristics, including the scale of NGOs used to pro-
vide services, the organisation of support organisations, community involvement, the quality of outreach and the
strategy used for STI delivery, signiﬁcantly determined average costs, more so than environmental or population
inﬂuences. Examining costs at the NGO service level, programme scale, the extent of community mobilisation
and targeting group-based sex workers decreased unit costs. Conversely, costs per person reached were associated
with higher intensity of service delivery for STI visits, more condoms distributed and a higher number of outreach
clinics per person reached as well as by the replacement of the NGO. Average programme costs per person
reached decreased with increased scale of the NGO, the number of NGOs per district and the number of outreach
clinic and increased with the number of years of programme operation and the number of estimated high-risk
group population. Higher intensity of service delivery for STI visits and condoms distributed also increased costs.
Our ﬁndings on scale conﬁrm previous studies, for example, similar results were also reported in a study by
Dandona et al. (2008) where NGOs targeting 6000 high-risk individuals per year experienced economies of scale.
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Within the PANCEA project (HIV prevention), Marseille et al. (2007a) ﬁnd that doubling the number of sex
workers reached in India would result in a decrease of average cost by 41.8%. In addition to previous results
(Siapka et al., 2013), we did not ﬁnd any diseconomies of scale, suggesting that high reductions in cost can be
achieved by increasing the scale of the NGO, rather than recruiting new ones. The inclusion of programme cost
strongly increases economies of scale, suggesting that many above service costs are ﬁxed. Indeed, many activities
such as programmemanagement (for example, ﬁnancial management) and setting up systems like information sys-
tems are intuitively likely to be ﬁxed per NGO rather than dependent on the scale of that NGO. Other key expertise
enhancement activities, such as developing materials and training in community mobilisation, were also provided
equally to NGOs. These results highlight the importance of ensuring that above service level costs are considered
when examining optimal operational size. Our economies of scale results based on an average NGO size of 1868
high-risk population suggest that encouraging NGOs to merge to a scale beyond this size may substantially reduce
average costs. However, care needs to be taken before making strong policy recommendations, to balance any
efﬁciency gain made on the provider side through large NGOs with potential increases in key population costs
to access services, and loss of the sense of community ownership that may be a characteristic of smaller NGOs.
Our ﬁnding that community mobilisation activities can reduce costs may be due to the potential of community
mobilisation to improve the uptake of other services, such as STI treatment, referral for voluntary counselling and
testing services, condom promotion and behaviour change communication efforts. A greater number of members
of programme committees may allow NGOs to reach high-risk populations at a lower cost, possibly through com-
munity mobilisation and stigma reduction, and the involvement of communities in key management decisions may
also help improve economic efﬁciency. However, our results suggest that the manner in which communities are
involved in HIV prevention may impact costs. For example, we found that the number of DICs (ﬁxed sites) per
person reached was not correlated with NGO and programme average cost – this may a bidirectional inﬂuence, with
more community involvement in DICs balancing the additional costs of running centres. The fact that we did not
ﬁnd any inﬂuence of community involvement on programme average costs could be explained by the fact that over-
all programme costs may reﬂect that where communities were involved, NGOs required more programmatic sup-
port. However, in the longer run, this need for capacity building support may decrease, and this balance may change.
We also found that the way in which NGOs are supported impacts on costs. While there is a robust debate on
incentives provided by different contracting systems, the same grant-making approach was used across Avahan. In
addition to grant awarding, Avahan provided other forms of non-monetary support to enhance performance, such
as participatory performance reviews and feeding back the analysis of routine monitoring and evaluation data,
including surveys and cost data, to NGOs. Our ﬁndings suggest that variation in these and other characteristics
and practices of SLPs (or other supporting or implementing organisations) may have an important role to play.
Further qualitative work is ongoing to better understand how different forms of SLP organisation and approach
could inﬂuence NGO costs. It also should be noted that higher total costs at the SLP level may not necessarily result
in more inefﬁciency. In some instances, higher total costs may improve the efﬁciency at NGO level by providing
the necessary technical assistance and enhance quality of service delivery.
Our study reports some ﬁndings that are at ﬁrst glance counter-intuitive. For instance, the negative effect on
the numbers of STI treated on NGO average contradicts the ﬁndings that the number of STI visits increases
average cost. These however may be explained by the fact that NGOs with higher levels of treatment used lower
cost diagnostic techniques (that may have lower speciﬁcity), and these referral clinics may operate at lower cost
than NGO-operated clinics. This element then suggests some heterogeneity in STI treatment and that STI treat-
ment is a poor metric of quality. The number of years in Avahan is positively associated with cost, while others
studies suggest that costs fall over time because of learning by doing (Menzies et al., 2012). This increase could
be explained by an expansion of scope over time not captured by our other controls (including tuberculosis
services, for example), but may suggest that prices faced by the programme may be increasing faster than the
national rate of inﬂation (possibly the impact of the large increase in demand for key resources caused by rapid
scale-up). It also could reﬂect the fact that NGOs that ﬁrst entered into the programme were more efﬁcient
because they worked in more accessible towns; as programmes expanded to NGOs in more remote areas, costs
increased. At the programme level, we ﬁnd a positive effect of the estimated population on programme cost. The
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most plausible explanation is that the mapping of high-risk groups contained some measurement error. Because
NGOs use this information to plan activities, this error could have been a source of inefﬁciency.
Although this is the ﬁrst study powered to fully analyse the determinants of the average cost of NGO-
delivered HIV prevention services in a low-income setting, there are some limitations. First, this study used
data from one country (as there is currently no other data set of this magnitude globally), and more evidence
is required from other settings. Second, scale-up and cost may be simultaneously determined, as efﬁcient NGOs
may be more likely to scale up their services. This is likely to result in an overestimation of the effect of NGO
scale on cost. Third, there could be some measurement error in the proxies used to measure the quality of
outreach and community mobilisation (Wheeler et al., 2012). Finally, we only considered provider-side costs
and did not take into account societal costs related to factors such as the accessibility of NGOs, because of data
availability limitations. However, provider costs are relevant for programme planners, and the inclusion of user
costs may be poorly comparable given heterogeneity between areas regarding the level of prices, availability of
infrastructure and preferences of targeted populations regarding transport means.
6. CONCLUSION
Where NGOs are funded by grants, decision makers may still be able to inﬂuence costs through programmatic
decisions and the form of grant provided; organisational factors such as scale of NGOs to provide grants to,
specifying the need for active involvement of communities and the approach taken to support and supervision
may have a substantial impact on the costs and economic efﬁciency on programmes that scale up HIV preven-
tion using NGOs. These factors are important to explicitly consider and assess when designing and
implementing such HIV prevention and other public health programmes in order to ensure that the greatest
number of beneﬁciaries are reached with these essential services, within the limited resources available.
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ENDNOTES
1. One may want to note that a reasonable reason for such ﬁnding comes from the fact that although the squared
term is statistically signiﬁcant at 1%, the minimum of the cost function at the programme level and NGO
level is 6995 and 5595 high-risk persons reached, which corresponds to the last percentile in both cost
distributions including only four and three NGOs, respectively, with diseconomies of scale.
2. That is, as the ratio of the percentage change in one variable to the percentage change in another variable.
3. e0.143 = 1.15.
4. Results are available upon request.
5. e0.993 = 0.37.
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